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HORACE'S USE OF CONCRETE EXAMPLES

...Insuevit pater optimus hoc me,
ut fugerem exemplis vitiorum quaeque notando.

So says Horace (*S.* 1.4.105-106¹), and then goes on to show how his father deters him from the faults of extravagance, unworthy love affairs, adultery by specific examples to be avoided, and spurs him on to virtue by offering him a model to be followed (107-123), concluding with the query (124-126):

...an hoc inhonestum et inutile factu
necne sit addubites, flagret rumore malo cum
hic atque ille?...

This boyhood lesson Horace has learned well: he still practices it, forming his own conduct on the basis of his observations of individuals (134-137):

...rectius hoc est:
hoc faciens vivam melius: sic dulcis amicis
occurram: hoc quidam non belle; numquid ego illi
imprudens olim faciam simile?

Whether directly as a result of this specific training, or simply in consequence of association with, or inheritance from, his father, the habit thus acquired perhaps serves Horace to an even greater degree and over a more extended field than he himself remarks or realizes. His method of thinking is always in terms of concrete, specific examples.² Though he is readier than his more limited father to reach philosophical theories and abstractions³, it is invariably on such examples that these are based.

His very imagery is in terms of the particular, not the general⁴, as any commentator on *C.* 1.1 may be expected to remind us: the ship is Cyprian (13), the sea is Myrtoan or Icarian (14, 15), the wine is Massic (19), the boar is Marsian (28). But such vividness may be expected from any poet⁵: Horace's is more far-reaching than that, and shows itself not in single instances but in lengthy series made up of separate instances.

Sometimes, to be sure, lists of this kind are included purely for their own sakes⁶. His aim may be simply to enumerate the attributes or exploits of some god, as Apollo (*C.* 4.6), Mercury (1.10), Bacchus (2.19), Fortune (1.35); or the achievements of some individual, as Pollio (2.1) or Augustus (4.14). He may be concerned merely with offering a series of remote places (1.22.5-8) or dangerous peoples (3.4.33-36, 3.8.17-24, 3.29.27-28, 4.5.25-28, 4.15.21-24⁷), or with cataloguing the effects of wine (3.21.13-24), types of athletic exercises (1.8.5-12), kinds of sea-food (*S.* 2.4.32-34) or other varieties of fare, lib., passim. But usually such a list is included not for its own intrinsic value, but for the serving of some broader purpose, which is generally either that of contrast or that of illustration.

In the first category, that of contrast, we frequently find the main thought following a series of negations. The contrast may be that of degree, the general idea being 'a or b or c is not true to so great a degree as, or to a greater degree than, D.'⁸ To point this idea, we may find *non tam quam*, as in *C.* 1.7.10-14;

me nec tam patiens Lacedaemon
nec tam Larisae percussit campus opimae,
quam domus Albunae resonantis
et praeceps Anio ac Tiburni lucus et uda
mobilibus pomaria rivis:

non aequae, non sic, ut, as in 1.16.5-9.

non Dindymene, non adytis quatit
mentem sacerdotum incola Pythius,
non Liber aequae, non acuta
sic geminant Corybantes aera,
tristes ut irae;

or comparatives, *non magis quam*, etc., as in *Ep.* 2.49-60,

non me Lucrina iuverint conchyliis
magisve rhombus aut scari,...
non Afra avis descendat in ventrem meum,
non attagen Ionicus

iucundior, quam lecta de pinguis-
 oliva ramis arborum
 aut herba lapathi prata amantis et gravi
 malvae salubres corpori,
 vel agna festis caesa Terminalibus
 vel haedus ereptus lupo,

and C. 4.8.13-20,

non incisa notis marmora publicis,
 per quae spiritus et vita redivit bonis
 post mortem ducibus, non celeres fugae
 reiectaeque retrorsum Hannibalis minae,
 non incendia Carthaginis impiae
 eius, qui domita nomen ab Africa
 lucratus rediit, clarius indicant
 laudes quam Calabriae Pierides...

More often, however, the first members are defini-
 tely excluded from the picture, the formula being 'not
 a or b or c but D'. The idea of 'but' is variously ex-
 pressed:— (1) by some special adversative word, (a)
*sed*¹⁰, as in Ep. 7.5-10,

non ut superbas invidae Carthaginis
 Romanus arces ureret,
 intactus aut Britannus ut descenderet
 Sacra catenatus via,
 sed ut secundum vota Parthorum sua
 urbs haec periret dextera,

C. 4.3.1-12,

quem tu, Melpomene, semel
 nascentem placido lumine videris,
 illum non labor Isthmii
 clarabit pugilem, non equus impiger
 curru ducet Achaico
 victorem, neque res bellica Deliis
 ornatum foliis ducem,
 quod regum tumidas contuderit minas,
 ostendet Capitolio:
 sed quae Tibur aquae fertile praefluunt
 et spissae nemorum comae
 fingent Aeolio carmine nobilem.

S. 1.6.58-60,

non ego me claro natum patre, non ego circum
 me Satureiano vectari rura caballo,
 sed quod eram narro,

Epis. 1.8.4-8,

...haud quia grando
 contuderit vitis oleamque momorderit aestus,
 nec quia longinquis armentum aegrotet in agris;
 sed quia mente minus validus quam corpore toto
 nil audire velim, nil discere, quod levet aegrum;

(b) *at*¹¹, as in C. 2.18.1-11,

non ebur neque aureum
 mea renidet in domo lacunar,
 non trabes Hymettiae
 premunt columnas ultima recisas

Africa, neque Attali
 ignotus heres regiam occupavi,
 nec Laconicas mihi
 trahunt honestae purpuras clientae:
 at fides et ingeni
 benigna vena est, pauperemque dives
 me petit...;

(c) *tamen*, as in 3.16.33-38,

quamquam nec Calabriae mella ferunt apes,
 nec Laestrygonia Bacchus in amphora
 languescit mihi, nec pingua Gallicis
 crescunt vellera pascuis,
 importuna tamen pauperies abest,
 nec, si plura velim, tu dare deneges;

or (2) by simple juxtaposition of opposed ideas¹², as
 in Ep. 16.3-10.

quam neque finitimi valuerunt perdere Marsi
 minacis aut Etrusca Porsenae manus,
 aemula nec virtus Capuae nec Spartacus acer
 novisque rebus infidelis Allobrox,
 nec fera caerulea domuit Germania pube
 parentibusque abominatus Hannibal,
 impia perdemus devoti sanguinis aetas,
 ferisque rursus occupabitur solum.

S. 1.9.31-33,

hunc neque dira venena nec hosticus auferet ensis,
 nec laterum dolor aut tussis, nec tarda podagra;
 garrulus hunc quando consumet cumque,

C. 1.31.1-8, 17-20¹³

quid dedicatum poscit Apollinem
 vates? quid orat de patera novum
 fundens liquorem? non opimae
 Sardiniae segetes feracis,

non aestuosae grata Calabriae
 armenta, non aurum aut ebur Indicum,
 non rura quae Liris quieta
 mordet aqua taciturnus amnis.

...
 frui paratis et valido mihi,
 Latoc, donec, at, precor, integra
 cum mente, nec turpem senectam
 degere nec cithara carentem.

At times the pattern is slightly more complex, as
 in 2.12.1-16:

nolis longa ferae bella Numantiae
 nec durum Hannibalem nec Siculum mare
 Poeno purpureum sanguine mollibus
 aptari citharae modis,

nec saevos Lapithas et nimium mero
 Hylaeum domitosque Herculeam manu
 Telluris iuvenes, unde periculum
 fulgens contremuit domus

Saturni veteris; tuque pedestribus
dices historiis proelia Caesaris,
Maecenas, melius ductaque per vias
regum colla minacium.

me dulces dominae Musa Licymniae
cantus, me voluit dicere lucidum
fulgentis oculos, et bene mutuis
fidum pectus amoribus.

Here the idea, reduced to its simplest terms, is: 'not the siege of Numantia, not the Punic Wars, not the battles of Centaurs and giants, not the exploits of Augustus¹⁴, are fit themes for my lyre, but the charms of Licymnia'. But this is complicated by the fact that Maecenas, in prose, *is* to celebrate the exploits of Augustus, and thus there is a contrast not only between the various themes unfit and the one theme fit for lyric verse, but also between Maecenas as a writer of prose (*tu*, line 9) and Horace as a writer of lyric verse (*me*, lines 13 and 14)¹⁵.

A contrast, not so important intrinsically, however, also complicates the situation slightly in 1.20.1-2, 9-12.
vile potabis modicis Sabinum
cantharis...

Caecubum et prelo domitam Caleno
tu bibes uvam: mea nec Falernae
temperant vites neque Formiani
pocula colles.

Here the idea is merely: 'I will offer you cheap Sabine wine, not Caecuban or Calenian or Falernian or Formian'; but Horace chooses to group the four expensive wines under two heads, the pair that Maecenas does drink (note *tu* in 10) and the pair that Horace does not (note *mea*, also in 10), though the real contrast is not between the first pair and the second, but between the two pairs jointly and the Sabine. It is to be observed that here the positive element, the Sabine wine, *precedes* the negative one, the list of the wines that Horace will not offer¹⁶; in this respect the present example differs from all those previously cited.

Elsewhere, too, in passages in which one important element is contrasted with a series of others, though without the use of a negative, the important idea occasionally precedes but far more often follows. As an instance of its precedence may be cited Epis. 1.6, where the march of the thought is as follows: 'you wish to live rightly (29 vis recte vivere): if virtue alone can make this possible (30 si virtus hoc una potest dare), do so-and-so; but if other things count, as wealth (47 si res sola potest facere et servare beatum), or luxurious food (56 si bene qui cenat bene vivit), or pleasure (65-66 si ... sine amore iocisque/nil est iucundum), do so-and-so'.

The important element that follows a group of contrasting ones is frequently Horace himself. Others do so-and-so or like such-and-such, but Horace does *thus* or likes *this*. Note the emphatic *me* or *nos* introducing a statement in which Horace is contrasted with others¹⁷ as regards his tastes in vocation, dwelling, or food, or his abilities in verse-making, in the following passages:—C. 1.1.29-32¹⁸.

me doctarum hederæ præmia frontium
dis miscent superis, me gelidum nemus
nympharumque leves cum Satyris chori
secernunt populo...;

1.7.10-14 (already quoted above¹⁹ in a different connection); 1.31.15-16,

... me pascunt olivæ,
me cichorea levesque malvæ²⁰;

1.6.17-19.

nos convivia, nos proelia virginum
sectis in iuvenes unguibus acrium
cantamus ...

At times the effect produced is not so much that of contrast as that of climax²¹. For instance, the enumeration of different types of madness and of slavery in S. 2.3 and 2.7 respectively leads up in each case to Horace's own type as the point of the entire discussion²²: note Horace's question in 2.3.301-302.

qua me stultitia, quoniam non est genus unum,
insanire putas? ...

and the answer in 307-325²³; and the comparable give and take in 2.7.21-22.

non dices hodie, quorsum hæc tam putida tendant,
furcifer? "ad te inquam." ...

the *ad te* being elaborated throughout the remainder of the *sermo*²⁴. Again, the roll-call of gods in C. 1.2.25-40, and of gods, demigods, and heroic men in 1.12.13-48, simply prepares us for the naming of Augustus as *grand finale* with which each of the odes closes²⁵. Perhaps we may class here, too, 3.11, in which Horace, after calling on the lyre to help him sing a song for Lyde (1-12), describes the effect of the instrument on even the denizens of the lower world, Cerberus, Ixion, Tityos, and the Danaids (17-24), and then seizes on the last-named as the theme for his song, the remainder of which he devotes entirely to them.²⁶

(To be concluded in the next number)

NOTES

¹In citations of Horace, I use the following abbreviations: C.—Carmina, Ep.—Epodi, Epis.—Epistulae, S.—Sermones. Successive references are to be interpreted as applying to the same division of his works when there is no indication to the contrary. In quotations I follow the Oxford Text, edited by Wickham; but I have occasionally made slight changes in the punctuation, and in C. 1.31.4 I read *feracis* with Kiessling and many others rather than *feraces* with Wickham, thus making it possible to join this word with *Sardiniae* instead of with *segetes* (cf. note 13).

21 I have attempted to check my impression concerning the unusual degree to which this tendency is manifest in Horace, by seeking to ascertain whether the same characteristic is present in comparable proportions in a contemporary poet who in many stylistic features resembles Horace. With this in view, I have examined the Eclogues and the Georgics (the Aeneid as a narrative poem seems too unlike Horace's works to be of value for my purpose). Except for the type of expression referred to in note 33 and the other notes there cited, I have found startlingly few parallels from Vergil. Most of them are listed in the footnotes: for them and for other details concerning Vergil, see notes 5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 16, 19, 22, 27, 50.

3Cf. 1.4.115-116, quoted below.

4Cf. especially Smith's Introduction to his edition, §117.

5Yet this very vividness may in some be paradoxically combined with a certain vagueness of which I think Horace is never guilty—for instance, Vergil, though he seems to be thinking concretely, is not really doing so when he assigns Cydonian arrows and a Parthian bow to Gallus (Ecl. 10.59) or an Amyclaeon dog and a Cretan quiver to a Libyan (Georg. 3.345).

6As are the numerous ones given to serve his didactic or narrative purposes by Vergil:—e. g. catalogues of trees and other products in the Georgics, of warriors and tribes in the Aeneid.

7On the last four examples, cf. note 9.

8Cf. Vergil, Georg. 2.136-139.

9The effect of a series of negatives is also created by the passages in which Horace reproaches Maecenas for worrying over possible enemies (C. 3.29.25-28) and urges him to dismiss such cares (3.8.17-24). In both these cases, the implied thought is: Do not think about this enemy or this one or this one, but simply give yourself up to the pursuit of pleasure. 4.5.25-28 and 4.15.17-24 are different: here Horace is merely listing those enemies or other perils that the Romans need no longer fear. Perhaps slightly akin to these instances is S. 1.10.78-88, where Horace asks whether he need be troubled by the aspersions of a few worthless critics, Pantilius, Demetrius, and Fannius the friend of Tigellius, when he has the approval of a large group of worthy ones.

10Cf. Vergil, Georg. 2.140-150.

11Cf. Vergil, Georg. 2.461-474.

12At times the main idea is not presented, but is tacitly implied. *Otium*, for instance, is *non gemmis neque purpura ve/fnale neque auro* (C. 2.16.7-8): that is, it is too precious to be purchasable at all.

13These passages are separated by two strophes which follow a different model, that of the *alii . . . me* type (cf. note 19), but which are really equivalent in thought to: *non Calenam vitem, non vina Syra reparata merce, (sed) olivas, cichorea, malvas (or olivae . . . malvae* if, as Moore's note on 3 f. forces us to assume he holds, and as the word order of 3-4 would seem to indicate, *segetes, armenta, aurum, ebur, and rura* are, by a slight anacoluthon, nominative, not accusative; this interpretation is still possible but less persuasive if with Wickham we read *feraces* rather than *feracis* in line 4—cf. note 1).

14Augustus's achievements are of course more important than the others listed here. Cf. note 30.

15Cf. note 17.—This poem, with its double contrast, between the divers themes that Horace will not attempt and the one that he will, and between Horace who cannot do justice to a special theme and another writer who can, is often compared with 1.6. But in the latter ode the emphasis is a little different, the parallels being inserted for their similarity rather than for their contrast, as I shall endeavor to show below.

16In some instances an affirmative statement is succeeded by a series of negatives which constitute rather an expansion of it than a contrast with it. Such affirmative statements are in *tuae spem gratiae* (Ep. 1.24), *procul negotiis* and *solutus omni faenore* 2.1, 4), *destructus ensis cui super impia cervice pendet* (C. 3.1.17-18), *desiderantem quod satis est* (ib. 25), *iustum et tenacem propositi virum* (3.3.1), *monumentum aere perennius* (3.30.1), each of which is followed by a succession of concrete instances couched in the negative. Cf. the similar series of negatives in Vergil, Georg. 2.495-499 after *ille deos qui novit agrestis* (493).

17These passages are of course quite different from those in which Horace is contrasted not with a more or less illustrative list of undefined persons relegated to the background, but with a single individual who is of equal importance with himself, and who is often marked by *tu* or *te* in contrast with the *ego, mihi, me, meus* (in various forms), or *nos* generally used of Horace. The other person is commonly compared with Horace (1) as a writer, usually superior, at least in ability to treat a special theme, e. g. Varius (C. 1.6), Maecenas (2.12), Julius Antonius (4.2.33-48), Pindar (ib. 25-32); but occasionally inferior, e. g. Alpinus (S. 1.10.36-39); (2) as a person of different tastes, e. g. Davus (2.7.46 and passim), Fuscus (Epis. 1.10.6-7 and passim), the *vilicus* (1.14.10 and passim); (3) as a wealthier man able to make more expensive sacrifices or to indulge in greater luxury, e. g. Maecenas (C. 1.20.9-12, 2.17.30-32), Grosphus (2.16.33-40), Julius Antonius (4.2.53-60). With this last type of contrast, compare that in 3.23 of Phidyle, referred to by an emphatic *te* in 13, with those who can afford richer offerings. Horace also contrasts his escape from war with Pompeius's return to it (2.7.13-16), his horoscope with Maecenas's (2.17.22-30), his songs with Lyde's (3.28.9-15)—here the contrast is weak. Occasionally he at least tacitly compares himself as he is now with himself as he once was (1.14.17-20, 3.14.25-28, 4.1.3-4, Epis. 1.7.25-28). Cf., too, the contrast between the contemptible critics who scorn Horace and the reputable ones who admire him, in S. 1.10.78-88, already referred to in note 9.

18S. 1.10.40-48, in which Horace lists the fields in which other poets are outstanding and then claims that of satire for himself, may at first sight appear similar, but is, I think, not quite parallel, since here Horace seems to be listing the supremacy of Fundanius in comedy, Pollio in tragedy, Varius in epic, and Vergil in pastoral not only by way of contrast with his own choice of satire, but as a reason for his choice, since this genre, and this alone, was left for him.

19The passage in which these lines occur, in which *laudabunt alii* is followed by an emphatic *me*, is compared by many commentators with Vergil's famous lines, Aen. 6.847-853, in which *excudent alii* is followed by an emphatic *tu*. Another, though less close, parallel from Vergil is found in Georg. 2.503-515, beginning *solicitant alii*, the *alii* being contrasted with *agricola* in 513. Cf. further below, note 28.

20Cf. note 13.

21Cf. note 32.

22Cf. Vergil's enumeration (Georg. 3.242-266) of the violent manifestations of the mating instinct on the part of various animals, with that of mares as the climax up to which he is leading and with which he proceeds (267-283) to deal in detail. On this passage see further below, note 50.

23However, 326 indicates that at least in Horace's opinion Damasippus is even madder than himself.

24However, in the subsequent contrast between slave and master some of the points made concerning the master (as the commentators—e. g. Morris in his introductory note—remind us) hardly apply to Horace.

25Cf. notes 14 and 30.

²⁶Horace here, with the fine art which conceals art, creates the effect of improvisation much as it is described for the musician, and (again only seemingly) exemplified for the poet, by Lowell at the beginning of the *The Vision of Sir Launfal*:

Over his keys the musing organist,
Beginning doubtfully and far away,
First lets his fingers wander as they list,
And builds a bridge from Dreamland for his lay.

E. ADELAIDE HAHN

HUNTER COLLEGE

REVIEWS

Horace and His Lyric Poetry. By H. P. WILKINSON. ix, 185 pp. (Cambridge, at the University Press; New York, The Macmillan Company). \$2.75

One good gift must be credited to the war. Scholars in many fields, called off into military activities have gained a new perspective in their more ordinary spheres. They have found that it is not beneath their dignity to write something that people other than specialists would like to read. The temporary change in their own immediate objectives, setting them free from the clutch of deadening details, has made it possible for them to write interestingly about the things that mean most to them.

Wilkinson's *Horace and His Lyric Poetry* is a case in point. He claims to write for Classical scholars who are not Horatian specialists. His words, however, will have a much wider range: anyone with intellectual curiosity will find them well worth reading. In the first place, Wilkinson knows his subject; in the second place, he writes well; in the third place, he presents only the most interesting phases of his subject; in the fourth place, his book boldly presents intelligent opinions without too much documentation; finally, he is brief: his book is small.

Of course a book of this sort arouses all kinds of objections in the reader's mind, the more numerous in proportion to the reader's own knowledge of and devotion to Horace. But that is as it should be. I, for one, cannot agree that the Roman Odes are independent poems simply grouped together casually for publication; I cannot find it possible to weigh against each other in any known scale 'serious poetic art' and 'versified talk'; I cannot believe that *Satires* II.3 is the serious development of a Stoic paradox, or that *Lamia*, in *Odes* I.26, is unimportant, in view of the emphatic repetition *bunc . . . bunc*; I do not personally like rhymed couplets as a medium for translating the satires. But this book is a book of opinions, scholarly, intelligent opinions, common-sense opinions, intriguing opinions. Without any attempt to popularize Horace, it creates or revives a warm interest in the friendliest of Roman poets.

This result comes largely from a genius for simplification. Wilkinson knows all of the scholastic problems and squabbles that mark the history of Horatian studies, but he does not darken his pages with them. He presents simply and briefly his mature appraisal of the pertinent results of scholarship, his own and others'. Always it is Horace the man who is emerging, so that the Odes become his natural expression. His moral sense, his tolerance, his pleasant humor, his perfectly natural attitude toward church and civil state and towards philosophy too, and his one real enthusiasm, the naturalization of the Lesbian meters—all these, presented with admirable taste and with a sure touch, merge in a personality that will appeal especially to all those who are returning from war with deep-rooted but diffident anticipation of a saner life.

The book is well balanced. Preface and Introduction are brief, so is the refreshingly simple account of Horace's Life and Works. The final chapter on Translation and the Epilogue are equally restrained. The three important chapters occupy nearly three-quarters of the volume: Character and Views, Attitude to Poetry, the Horatian Ode. In the first, Wilkinson develops Horace's views toward religion, morality, love and friendship, the country, and the state, with a dangerous few pages on his humor. These pave the way for the study of Horace the Poet. The author skirts as gracefully as Horace himself did the strictly philosophical quarrels of Epicureans and Stoics and so leaves the poet with his own individual integrity unsullied.

If a few more scholars returning to the academic shades will present the authors of their choice in similar form and readable style, I venture to predict that the intelligent reading public will soon realize why the Classicists still believe in their vocation.

C. W. MENDELL

YALE UNIVERSITY

MOIRA, Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought. By WILLIAM CHASE GREENE. ix, 450 pp. (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1944). \$5

In a book of this kind, quite apart from the interest of its various parts, the process of selection is doubly important. The subject, in itself, vague, must be kept within limits. Inevitably also, certain periods and authors are chosen for close attention. The work must therefore be considered from three points of view: the limitation of the theme, the authors or periods emphasized, and the interest of the discussions as such.

An introductory chapter gives a clear picture of what the author includes under his subject. Many con-

cepts are here discussed: the pervading pessimism in Greek thought and, associated with it, the group of ideas and attitudes typified by the famous *μηδὲν ἄγαν*; the notion of degeneration in time as in the mythical ages of man, etc.; the Stoic concept of endurance (*τλημοσύνη*) and the Aeschylean *πάθει μάθος*; the Orphic cycle of rebirth and its puritanism; the search for order, physical and moral, in the universe and with it the ate-hubris-nemesis formulae as well as the notions of *φύσις* and *νόμος*; the relation of casuality and the gods, the dual nature of those gods as natural and moral forces, and the restriction of their domain by Necessity and *ἔλγῃ* in opposition to the more divine *νοῦς*; the conflict between the physical and the moral, appearance and reality, with the resulting dualisms; finally the development 'from an external to an internal conception of life' and its widespread resulting changes in ethics and religion. This whole group of fundamental ideas, and others of minor importance, are understood under Moira. This is a vast and overlapping mass, and Professor Greene is to be congratulated in that they are dealt with for the most part without confusion and that, with some exceptions, he has avoided the temptation of many attractive tangents.

The choice of fields of discussion, however, is much more subjective and much less easy to accept. In effect the book is a discussion of the above groups of ideas in the early poets from Homer and Hesiod to Pindar and Bacchylides, in the three tragedians, and in the philosophers, mainly the Sophists, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Except for a brief and welcome discussion of Orphism, there is little but the poets until the sophists. This is in part due to an unfortunate tendency to go from author to author, with too much attention to their individual points of view, instead of using them merely as evidence for more general discussions of the gradual development of ideas and attitudes. I should have welcomed more discussion of Professor Greene's own conclusions, at least from Homer to the philosophers. The historians are almost ignored: Herodotus gets a very few pages (less than Pindar) and Thucydides is mentioned only incidentally to a discussion of *φύσις* and *νόμος*. This is especially unfortunate in the latter case, for Thucydides surely has a considerable contribution to make to our subject. Orators are passed over, and writers of comedy hardly mentioned. So, in the last chapter, which sweeps us along from Aristotle to Milton, the process of selection is very dubious. The fundamental step from the ethic of man-in-society to the extreme individualism of all later philosophy is not well brought out, nor the Stoics' valiant attempt to moderate it. The Epicureans are dismissed in a very few paragraphs, and the Stoics fare little better, while Cicero very surprisingly gets more space than they, and Alexander of Aphrodisias gets as much attention as Plotinus. Nor is there any discussion of the great controversy between the last pagan and the first Christian

thinkers. These are serious limitations. Within them, however, the various sections deserve close attention. That on Homer is both interesting and suggestive, and Professor Greene avoids the temptation to father on Homer any consistent system of thought. Rather does he bring out the meaning of key ideas and expressions which, contradictory as they sometimes are, we shall then follow through later writers, such as the inconsistent functions of the Olympians who are both nature gods and anthropomorphic ethical forces, the inconsistencies of double responsibility, both divine and human, the concept of endurance (*τλημοσύνη*) and that curious *ἀτασθαλίη*, which comes as near to a sense of sin as Greek ever does. We are warned that excessive personification is post-Homeric, as is the jealousy of the gods. All this makes a good introduction to the later discussions.

In Hesiod we have the notion of progress and the triumph of Zeus in the Theogony contrasted with the pessimism of the Works and Days, the decline of man in the myths and a determined attempt of making a virtue of necessity by a gospel of hard work. In the early poets are found seeds of later development: the gradual importance attached to the inner man, the revolt against visiting the sins of parents upon the children, the varying emphasis upon chance, and, of course, Solon's gospel of moderation and *εὐνομία*. The chapter on 'Orthodoxy and Mysticism' is of necessity less tied to individual authors, and the better for it, with its discussion of *φθόνος θεῶν*, the mysteries, the traditional and Orphic cosmologies. Thus we come down to Pindar, Simonides, and Herodotus.

The considerable section on tragedy, one-third of the whole, is the weakest part of the book. The importance of the tragedians is indeed obvious, but the balance could have been restored had the author refrained from discussing tragedy as such, in a manner not always relevant to the main theme, and, above all, if he had not thought it necessary to discuss each play in turn. The result is that, while these chapters contain much that is both interesting and suggestive, the threads are not sufficiently woven together, and the discussion of the general outlook emerging from the dramas of each tragedian regrettably short.

However, the general contribution of Aeschylus and Sophocles is fairly set out, but the section on Euripides fails to come to grips with essentials. Aeschylus' rejection of the already traditional jealousy of the gods, his insistence on persuasion and justice as against arbitrary violence, the more orthodox attitude of Sophocles, his referring of both evil and good to the gods without loss of belief in the ultimate justice, and his imaginative, if vague, resolving of the contradictions implied, all this emerges definitely. But the traditional view of Euripides, as a mere philosophizing poet of the stage, is far too easily accepted, and I have argued at

length elsewhere that the general effect of his plays as a whole, about the gods in particular, is by no means as inconsistent or as difficult to establish as is here supposed.

From here on, Professor Greene deals with the philosophers, and, for me at least, that is where the book really comes to life. The discussion of the origin and meaning of the νόμος-φύσις controversy is excellent. That on Socrates with his identification of the good and the useful, his equation of virtue with knowledge, and the rest, remains on the same high level, and eminently satisfying. 'As against the Sophists, Socrates and Plato undertake to show that there may be discerned a *nomos* a law of development and control, of harmony and proportion, in the *physis* of man. Furthermore, this law of human nature can exist only within a larger and beneficent order, the *physis* of the *cosmos*.'

The important sections on Plato and Aristotle I found, each in its way, equally good reading. Certainly I should disagree with the interpretation of a number of passages, particularly of Plato, but those are matters of opinion, and Professor Greene's presentation is both interesting and worth while. Let me here mention only one important point of disagreement: I do not believe that 'in the realm of physics Plato gradually shifts the emphasis from science to theology, from astronomy to cosmology, from ideas to God' except in the most superficial sense, or that in the *Timaeus* God allows 'his perfection to flow into innumerable and endless forms of expression'. Indeed, I distrust interpretations which make Plato part Aristotelian, part neo-Platonist, and part Christian. It is a temptation that must, I believe, be resisted.

The last chapter, whose limitations have already been mentioned, traces some general conceptions over a very wide field. The appendices, which are in effect extended notes and references, are valuable to the student and provide fairly complete bibliographies, gathered together under subjects and authors, and a select bibliography follows.

As this review may sound somewhat critical, let me end by making it very clear that Professor Greene's book is a valuable contribution to a very wide and important subject, and if the author's scrupulous presentation of all his evidence may prove a stumbling block to the general reader, students, and teachers of all grades, will find it of considerable value in deepening their own understanding, in suggesting how to awaken interest, and as a ground-work for further studies.

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ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES

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EPIGRAPHY. NUMISMATICS

MATTINGLY, HAROLD. *Carausius: His Mints and His Money System*. The three chief mints of Carausius are (1) London, which signs L, (2) Clausentum (Bitterne) and not Camulodunum or Corinium, as hitherto supposed, which signs C, (3) Rutupiae (Richborough), which signs RSR. Besides these regular mints, and the barbaric imitations, there were a series of well-struck coins which bear marks of the series rather than mint marks, and which must be closely associated with the official coinage. One remaining class of coins was struck on the continent and has coin-types varying considerably from those struck in Britain. Under Carausius Britain still refused to accept the reform of Aurelian. The gold and bronze coinage are very rare; the pure silver issue at the beginning of his reign was later abandoned.

Ant 75 (1945) 122-4

(Hansen)

RAUBITSCHK, ANTONY E. *Hadrian as the Son of Zeus Eleutherios*. IG. ii², 3312, 3321, and 3322 are part of a single inscription, from the base of a statue of Hadrian. This is one of three such pedestals from the Akropolis, and both its monumental size and the fact that Hadrian is here addressed as the son of Zeus Eleutherios suggest that this may be the pedestal of the statue of Hadrian set up in the Parthenon. It should be noted that there is no available evidence to support the assumption that Hadrian was identified at Athens with Zeus Eleutherios. Why Trajan was here given that epiklesis is not known; his victories over the Parthians may have provided the occasion. Two other inscriptions, one from the Agora Excavations, and IG. ii², 3285, are discussed in brief appendices. III.

AJA 49 (1945) 128-33

(Walton)

TOD, MARCUS N. *A Greek Inscription from the Persian Gulf*. A brief dedication which may date from the latter part of the fourth, or the opening years of the third century B.C. It is possibly connected with the expedition of Alexander's admiral Nearchus in 325-323.

JHS 63 (1943) 112-3

(Ridington)

HISTORY. SOCIAL STUDIES

HOPPER, R. J. *Interstate Juridical Agreements in the Athenian Empire*. Independent allies possessed agreements with Athens on a basis of complete equality. In the case of subject allies the agreements could also provide for the judgment of civil cases concerning members of the subject state alone.

JHS 63 (1943) 35-51

(Ridington)